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THE PEOPLE OF ISRAEL VS. JESUS
OF NAZARETH
By Robert L. Stearns of the Denver Bar

T is said that when Voltaire was 83 years old, he became
very ill, and a priest was sent to shrive him. Voltaire, who
was always sceptical of churches, said to the priest:
"From whom do you come, M. l'Abbe?"
"From God, himself", was the answer.
"Well, well, sir; your credentials?"
I realize my own shortcomings enough to know that I am
not qualified as a theologian to discuss this, one of the world's
greatest trials, from the standpoint of its religious and ecclesiastical consequences. It is my purpose merely to discuss the
trial from a legal standpoint, and remove from consideration,
as much as possible, the question of divine origin. I am not
intentionally irreverent. I am merely trying to avoid one of
the errors common to many of the legal commentators on

this subject.
While this is the viewpoint I will ask you to take with
me, we must remember that one of the principal charges filed
against Jesus was the high crime of blasphemy. The question
of guilt or innocence, therefore, depended largely upon
whether or not the court believed that the accused was the
Son of God. It did not believe the accused, and the death
penalty was inflicted. Did the accused receive a fair and impartial trial from a legal standpoint, according to the laws
and methods then prevailing among the people of Israel, subject to the Roman sovereignty? To that question, more or
less directly, I will endeavor to address myself.
Once upon a time there was a piece of real estate in Asia
Minor about 150 miles wide and 300 miles long, pinched in
between the Arabian Desert and the Mediterranean Sea.
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Over here was Egypt; up at the top was Assyria; over on the
east was Babylonia. The Arabian Desert was unsafe for
travel. The Great Sea, or the Uttermost Sea, as the Mediterranean was then called, was full of monsters, and the liners
did not get much beyond the three mile limit.
Consequently, when one man, or an army, wanted to go
from one of these places to the other, he had to cross this
little strip of real estate, and for centuries they crossed and
re-crossed, conquered and re-conquered this small, but important, Land of Israel, harassing, imprisoning and educating
its people. Occasionally, a local hero, like David or Solomon,
drove out the invaders and set up a strong local government,
only to have it fall before the next invading conqueror.
But this tumultuous history did two things for the people
of Israel.
First, it kindled a fervent hope that some day from among
their number would step forth a mighty ruler, who would
establish a powerful temporal kingdom, and revive the splendors of the House of David and the regal magnificence of
KingSecond,
Solomon.
it developed an amazing religious solidarity and
fortified their firm conviction that the Egyptians, Assyrians,
Persians, Greeks and Romans, with their multifarious deities,
were all wrong. Throughout its whole tragic history, the
people of Israel clung to their great belief in one God. The
whole religious yearning of the race was centered in the God
of its worship. Small wonder, therefore, that blasphemy was
a heinous crime. Small wonder that one who proclaimed
himself king, but wore no royal purple, should get a very cold
shoulder; and small wonder that a people. anticipating a temporal kingship should fail to be sympathetic with one who
promulgated not a code of laws, but a code of living.
In 56 B. C., the late Roman General Pompey defeated
the last of the ancient line of Syrian kings, and claimed as
his, by conquest, the indefeasible fee simple title to our historic strip of real estate. This resulted in Roman dominion
and rule over Judea.
The administration of the country was entrusted to a
procurator, who was subordinate to the lieutenant governor
of Syria, and this form of administration lasted from the year
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6 to the year 41 A. D. Thus, in the year 29 A. D., in which
the trial of Jesus and the events which gave rise to it, took
place, Jerusalem, the principal city of Judea, belonged to a
province of Rome, under the lieutenant governor of Syria,
that post being then held by Flaccus Pomponius, the actual
government being exercised in the name of Pomponius by a
procurator named Pontius Pilate. This was under the reign
of Tiberius Caesar.
The Roman conquerors, with admirable foresight, did
not undertake t6 change the local laws of their dominions as
to minor offenses. Thus, Pilate was empowered to apply
either the Roman law or the local law in any case where the
offense was against both the Province and the Empire, as in
the crime of murder. In the case of treason, however, with
which offense Jesus was likewise charged, Pilate could only
apply the law of Rome under the forms of Roman procedure.
The nature of the offense must, therefore, be considered in
determining the tribunal before which it might properly be
tried.
It is extremely difficult to obtain a clear statement of the
charges filed against Jesus, from a judicial standpoint. Practically our only source of information is the narrative contained in the four Gospels. The pleadings, as disclosed by
the record, are a bit vague, and it is next to impossible to
arrive at an understanding of the charges filed, or perhaps I
should say hurled, without knowing something of the nature
of the people who hurled them.
The Jewish people at this time were divided into factions, based upon their respective prejudices and disposition
for political and religious graft. Among these were the
Pharisees, who were the religious zealots of the day. They
were extremely ritualistic and careful in their observance of
religious forms, but it is whispered among the uncharitable,
that they used their-religion as a mask behind which to hide
their corruption. The Sadducees, who were formerly the
aristocrats of the day, were the persons from whom were
drawn the rulers of the nation before their power was wrested
from them by the Roman government. They were quite
friendly to the Roman rule, but they had small regard for the
people; and their acquisitive proclivities were developed well-
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nigh to the point of greed. In matters of religion they were
more rationalistic, but they had no great popular following.
There were various other factions and parties at the time, but
it is sufficient here to say, that Jesus and his followers belonged
to no single one of these groups; in fact, his teachings were
antagonistic to the doctrines and interest of these factions, thus
giving rise to a desire on their part for his destruction, and a
concerted movement to accomplish this result.
At first, the Pharisees expressed wonder and astonishment
at the teachings of Jesus, but when they saw his popular following and the manner of his reception by the people, they
felt their pride as religious leaders had been weakened, and
their power and income threatened. At first they did not venture an open rupture with him, but attempted to discredit him
among his followers by the time-honored method of heckling.
In this, however, they were not successful; but his disregard
of their time-honored religious observances and his repeated
violations of their blue laws convinced them that he was a
dangerous character.
The opposition of the Sadducees apparently had its inception when Jesus cleaned house in the temple. Disturbing
the franchises of the vested interests has ever been an effective
method of arousing their animosity. This case was no exception.
Then came the arrival of Jesus in Jerusalem on or about
the Feast of the Passover, in the year 29. Apparently, the
public demonstration was remarkable, and gave strong impetus to the determination of the oppositon for his destruction; but what offense had been committed the opposition was
unable to determine. Apparently, therefore, after a consultation among themselves, they sent a deputation to him, to inquire concerning his religious and political views, in the hope
that by so doing, they might obtain some incriminating commitment. They inquired, for example: "Is it lawful to give
tribute to Caesar, or not?" Had he said "Yes", the Pharisees
would have denounced him to the people as an enemy to their
liberties. Had he said "No", he would have been brought
before Pilate with a charge of treason. His famous answer
increased their dilemma: "Render unto Caesar the things
which are Caesar's, and unto God the things which are God's."
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This process took place from time to time during the next
few days, until they determined to apprehend him, apparently
on the charge of blasphemy. He was accordingly arrested.
Now, at this time, a brief digression in the narrative is
necessary, to describe the Jewish court and code of criminal
procedure.
The administration of justice among the Hebrew people
was entrusted to three classes of courts. First in point of inferiority was the "Court of Three", which was composed of
three judges, one chosen by each party to the litigation, and
the third selected by the two thus chosen. No educational
qualifications were necessary for membership. An appeal
from their determination lay to the minor Sanhedrin, or lower
council of laws. These courts existed in every town of more
than one hundred families, and consisted of 23 judges, each
appointed by the court and Sanhedrin sitting at Jerusalem.
They had jurisdiction of lesser crimes and misdemeanors. An
appeal would lie from the lesser Sanhedrin to the Great Sanhedrin. This latter court was the supreme tribunal of the
Jews. It had original jurisdiction of crime$ punishable by
death, and of offenses involving the peace and majesty of the
people. It consisted of two presiding officers, a religious
chamber of 23' priests, a law chamber of 23 scribes, and a
popular chamber of 23 elders. Extreme care was taken in the
selection. Its sessions were held in Jerusalem, and 23 members constituted a quorum. Under the law, its members could
not act prosecutors or accusers, but were required to protect
and defend the accused.
A most elaborate system of the protection of an accused
person was developed by the Hebrew jurisprudence. Some
of these essential points are as follows:
1. The person must be arraigned, the process consisting
of reading the charges in open court by the clerk.
. 2. The charges were based upon an accusation previously made by some person familiar with the facts.
3. Next came the introduc'tion of testimony against the
accused, following which an opportunity was given him to
offer his defense, and to introduce witnesses in support thereof.
4. Thereupon, one of the judges was supposed to make
a summary of the case, and all judges were to proceed to ballot.
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5. Two scribes tabulated the votes, one taking down
those cast in favor of acquittal, and the other those in favor
of conviction.
6. If a majority of the court voted for acquittal, the
accused was set at liberty. If a majority voted for conviction,
no announcement of the finding could then be made, as at least
one day must intervene between the vote of conviction and the
pronouncement of the verdict and the sentence.
7. After the proper interval had elapsed, another vote
was taken. A judge who had originally voted to condemn
might now change his opinion, and vote to acquit; but one
who originally voted for acquittal was not permitted to change
his opinion and now vote for a conviction.
8. Under the law, it was the duty of the court to defend
the accused, and a verdict of guilty, without some member of
the court having interposed a defense, was invalid.
9. The court was prohibited by law from entering upon
the trial of a criminal case on Friday, for the reason that such
trial could not be conducted on the Sabbath, nor could it be
postponed over the Sabbath.
10. Any indignities inflicted upon the accused during
the progress of his trial subjected those who committed them
to the same punishment as if they were inflicted upon one who
was not accused.
Many other and similar refinements could be noted.
The Professor of Religious History at Harvard, Moore,
has written an interesting work on Judaism, wherein he speaks
of these unusual and stringent limitations as follows:
"It is clear that with such a procedure, conviction in capital cases was
next to impossible, and that this was the intention of the framers of the rules
is equally plain. The Mishna itself brands a court which executes one man
in seven years as ruinous. (Jewish Talmud, Mishna X: The Sanhedrin who
executes a person once in seven years is considered pernicious.) It should be
observed, however, that when the court was convinced of the guilt of the accused, though the evidence did not warrant his conviction, they might imprison
him on bread and water (Mishna, Sanhedrin, 9, 5). * * * It cannot be imagined that any government charged with the maintenance of public order
and security ever devised and put into practice a code of procedure the effect
and intent of which was to make the conviction of criminals impossible."

The limitations to the jurisdiction of the Sanhedrin above
referred to are contained in the Talmud as we know it today.
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But the Talmud as we know it today is the outgrowth of the
results of the collaboration of numerous rabbis, and was not
completed until approximately 500 A. D. We cannot, therefore, say with certainty that the method of procedure now set
out in the Talmud was the method of procedure in vogue in
29 A. D. Upon this point Professor Moore says:
"The inquiry whether the trial of Jesus was 'legal', i. e., whether it conformed to the rules in the Mishna, is futile, because it assumes that those rules
represent a judicial procedure of the Old Sanhedrin."

Practically all of the commentators who have discussed
this subject from the legal standpoint, assume, however, that
the procedure laid down in the Talmud as now known to us
was in effect at the time of the trial of Jesus. I shall make
the same assumption, because I am unable to prove the contrary.
Assuming, therefore, that these rules of procedure did
govern the Jews in the trial of capital cases in 29 A. D., did
they comply with these requirements in the instant case? This
takes us back to our historical narrative, the general order of
events of which are this:
1. He was led to Annas.
2. He was sent by Annas to Caiaphas, the high priest.
3. He was there brought before the Sanhedrin, tried and
condemned.
Annas was the father-in-law of Caiaphas, who was the
high priest, and apparently a man of considerable standing in
the community. If he should approve the condemnation of
Jesus, his approval would go a long way toward strengthening
the backbone of the opposition. The appearance before Annas
was an extra-legal process, as he had no official position with
the Sanhedrin. Apparently the trial met with the approval
of this man, for the accused was thereupon led to Caiaphas.
According to the version of St. John:
"Now, Caiaphas was he who had given the counsel to the Jews; that
it was expedient that one man should die for the people."

The high priest then asked Jesus concerning his doctrine.
The examination proceeded immediately to the crux of the
case, so far as the Jews were concerned, and was based upon
the ground of blasphemy. It must be borne in mind that the
Jewish commonwealth was a pure theocracy. The Old Testa-
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ment teachings, the Ten Commandments and the Mishna, had
for them the finality of authority far beyond the pronouncements of any temporal monarch. In Leviticus we read: "You
shall not profane my holy name; and I will be hallowed among
the children of Israel". In Genesis we read: "I am the Lord
thy God. They shall have no other gods before me". In
Isaiah we read: "I am the first and I am the last; and beside
me there is no God". And many other places emphasize the
terrific importance of this to the Jewish mind. The profanation of the Name was a heinous crime, so terrible that it was
extremely difficult of atonement. Rabbi Ishmael taught that
while all other classes of sins may be atoned for according to
their heinousness, by repentance, by the Day of Atonement,
by the chastisements cumulatively, yet not all, together, sufficed to atone, for the man through whom such Name is profaned. Such guilt is only wiped out by death.
Therefore, in answer to the inquiry concerning his doctrine Jesus said: "I have spoken openly to the world; I have
always taught in the synagogue and in the temple, whither all
Jews resort; and in secret I have spoken nothing."
Then it occurs to him that perhaps it might be in order
for the prosecution to call a few witnesses, and he says:
"Whyaskest thou me? Ask them who have heard that I have spoken
unto them; behold, they know what things I have said ;"

at which juncture he receives a blow from the bailiff, with the
rhetorical question: "Answerest thou the high priest so?"
Thereupon, further testimony was adduced, and one of
the witnesses said: '.'This man said, I am able to destroy the
temple of God and after three days to rebuild it."
Then the high priest came directly to the point, and he
inquired: "I adjure thee by the living God that thou tell us
if thou be the Christ, the son of God." Jesus said to him:
"Thou hast said it." In other words, he made a direct affirmative answer to the categorical inquiry.
Then the high priest rent his garments. The rending of
garments seems to be an expensive pastime indulged in by the
high priest as a symbol that a blasphemous profanation of the
Name has been uttered, The ballot was by acclamation. Before putting the matter to a vote, however, the high priest expressed himself rather strongly in favor of conviction. He

DICTA

said: "He hath blasphemed; what further need have we of
witnesses? Behold, now, you have heard the blasphemer,
what think you?" They answered and said: "He is guilty
of death."
This first trial before the Sanhedrin was concluded about
three o'clock in the morning of Friday. We have seen under
the Jewish Code, that in capital cases the death sentence could
not be pronounced until one full day had elapsed. We have
also seen that the trial of a capital case could not be commenced on Friday. However, it was the obvious desire of
the prosecution to get this matter over with, and accordingly,
they re-convened at daybreak on this same Friday. This second hearing was a perfunctory affair, in order to attempt a
compliance with the requirements of the code. At this time,
again, Jesus was interrogated, although no further witnesses
were brought forward. There seems to be no question but
that between these two trials, one ending at three o'clock in
the morning, and the other commencing at daybreak, the
prisoner was subjected to a considerable amount of insult,
violence and indignity.
It does not specifically appear that any of the members
of the Sanhedrin undertook to speak in his defense at either
trial. In his book on the Martyrdom of Jesus, Rabbi Wise
says if none of the judges defended the culprit, the verdict was
invalid. At least two of the historians assert that Gamaliel
the Ancient and Rabbi Naravi both undertook to defend the
accused. According to these historians, these two were the
only ones who voted for an acquittal. According to the Bible
narrative, not even these two voted for acquittal. The statement is, "And they all condemned him to be guilty of death".
Now, under the rule in the Talmud, the death penalty
might be inflicted upon a blasphemer in any one of four different ways:
Burning,
Stoning,
Strangling,
Beheading.
But Josephus tells us that the Jews lost their power to inflict
capital punishment in the year 6 A. D., when Judea formally
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became a Roman province. Moreover, you will note that
crucifixion was not among the forms of death prescribed for
a blasphemer by the Talmud, but it was the form of execution
then in vogue among the Romans.
After the verdict of the Sanhedrin, the court adjourned
to the Roman Procurator. Now, it would seem that this appeal to the Roman jurisdiction must have been based upon a
recognition of the Roman supremacy. This was a trial de
novo. His jurisdiction was plenary. His duty was to inquire
into the accusation made, and determine from all the facts and
circumstances whether the prisoner was guilty of an offense
punishable under the Roman law. If the crime Was not one
recognized by the Roman law, it became the duty of the procurator to refuse to proceed further with the case, and to
acquit the prisoner. Pilate proceeds, in a thoroughly judicial
attitude. His first inquiry is:
"What accusation bring ye against this man?"
Very well; what accusation? He has been tried and convicted of blasphemy before the Sanhedrin; but to blaspheme
the God of the Jews was not an offense against the Roman order. Apparently at a loss for a specific charge, the priests announced: "If he were not a malefactor, we would not have
delivered him up unto thee". Apparently they thought this
might be sufficient for the Roman governor; but Pilate seems
to have been a man of more than ordinary judicial discernment. He said: "Take him, and judge him according to thy
law"; whereupon the Jews were forced to admit their lack of
power, for they said: "It is not lawful for us to put any man
to death."
Thereupon, they advanced a new, charge. The critics
judge them harshly for this, but I am not sure that they deserve this harsh judgment. It strikes me that they were putting a different interpretation upon the same offense. The
offense which to them was blasphemy, because it identified
Jesus with the Deity, became now treason against the Roman
order, because it made Jesus the King of the Jews. They said:
"We found this fellow perverting the nation, forbidding to
give tribute to Cesar, saying, I am Christ the King". If this
charge were true, it constituted an offense against the Roman
order.
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From what we know of the character of Jesus and his
teachings with reference to submission to authority, it was
probably not true, but Pilate proceeded with his inquiry, and
said to Jesus: "Art thou the King of the Jews?" Thereupon
Jesus asked him: "Sayest thou this thing of thyself, or did
others tell it thee of me?" It seems reasonable for him to
inquire as to whether or not the charge came from the Roman
or the Jewish standpoint.
Thereupon Pilate replied: "Am I a Jew? Thy own nation and the chief priests delivered thee unto me."
Then Jesus answered in a manner that clearly indicated
he made no pretension to temporal power. He stated: "My
kingdom is not of this world." Whereupon Pilate inquired:
"Art thou then a king?" Whereupon Jesus again emphasized
the fact that he was attempting to distinguish between the
foundation of a faith and the foundation of an empire. He
said:
"Thou sayest I am a king. To this end was I born, and for this cause
came I into the world, that I should bear witness unto the truth."

In the light of religious teachings, we have come to be
amazed by the spiritual insight of these utterances; but to
Pilate, who was a ruler of blood and iron, submitting only to
the authority of the Roman Empire these words did not convey a great deal. He thereupon inquired: "What is truth?"
History has long debated the mental attitude of Pilate at the
time of making this inquiry. Tertullian concludes that he
was already in conviction a Christian. Bacon concludes that
he was a jesting Pilate, and asked the question for rhetorical
effect. Certainly, he did not wait for an answer, but proceeded
forthwith to a verdict of acquittal. He said: "I find no crime
in him."
Up to this time, the procedure as conducted by Pilate
was in conformity with Roman law. Pilate had given Jesus
a preliminary hearing, and had fearlessly pronounced the
judgment of acquittal. Professor Greenleaf, the authority on
evidence, says:
"Here was a sentence of acquittal, judicially pronounced, and irreversible except by higher power upon appeal; and it was the duty of Pilate thereupon to have discharged him."

The prosecution, however, did not desire to leave the
matter in this condition. They brought forth a new statement:
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"He stirreth up the people teaching throughout all Jewry, beginning from Galilee to this place." At the suggestion of the
place Galilee, Pilate, in spite of his judgment of acquittal,
considers on his own motion the matter of change of venue. It
so happens that at this time Herod Antipas, the tetrarch of
Galilee, is in Jerusalem in attendance upon the feasts. Obtaining from Jesus the admission that he is a Galilean, he sent
the prisoner over to Herod's palace. Here the prosecution
renewed its charges of treason and sedition.
Now, Herod, as tetrarch of Galilee, had jurisdiction of
offenses committed in Galilee. Inasmuch as the chief scene
of Jesus' teachings had been in the vicinity of Galilee, it might
have been proper that the trial take place before Herod, had
not Pilate previously assumed jurisdiction and undertaken to
acquit the accused. In this second Roman trial, in the words
of St. Luke, Herod "questioned him in many words" - a
method of interrogation not unknown even in these days. But
Jesus "answered him nothing". Apparently he preferred to
stand upon his constitutional rights. At this point the trial
seems to amuse Herod vastly, and he proceeds to make a joke
of the affair. According to the Gospel narrative, "Herod with
his army set him at naught, and mocked him, putting on him
a white garment, and sent him back to Pilate".
You will observe that here is no conviction; in fact, it is
another acquittal. The prosecution then appears a second time
with the accused before the Roman procurator. And Pilate,
"calling together the chief priests and the magistrates and the
people, said to them: You have presented unto me this man,
as one that perverteth the people; and behold, I having examined him before you, find no cause in this man in those
things wherein you accuse him. No, nor Herod neither. For
I sent you to him, and behold, nothing worthy of death is done
to him. I will chastise him, therefore, and release him."
This unquestionably constitutes the third consecutive acquittal before the Roman tribunal. But why chastise an innocent man? Evidently this was a sop thrown to the populace
in order to appease their clamor.
The record here says, "From thenceforth Pilate sought
to release him".
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Jesus was then taken over to the barrack room of the
guards. I think many of you will bear me out, that in practically every barrack room there are anywhere from one to a
dozen practical jokers. The fact that this poor, bedraggled
prisoner proclaimed himself a king, seems to have given rise
to much merry-making. With mock solemnity they arrayed
him in a purple garment, and plaited a crown of thorns in
wanton mockery of the imperial laurel. They bowed before
him with mock obeisance, and tendered homage in the form
of blows and scourges. He was then brought before the
howling populace.
At this point unquestionably Pilate's heart was touched,
and he uttered the now famous words, "Behold the man!"apparently an effort to enlist the sympathies of the aroused
multitude. To small effect, however, because they continued
their demands for crucifixion. Pilate then said: "Behold, I
bring him forth unto you, that you may know that I find no
cause in him." This appears to be a fourth affirmation by a
Roman official of the fact of proven innocence.
Again they cried for the blood of their appointed victim,
and turning away in disgust, Pilate said to them: "Take ye
him and crucify him, for I find no fault in him"-(a fifth
affirmation of innocence). Thereupon he was taken to the
appointed place and crucified.
Thus we have seen in the short space of a few hours the
accused subjected to two trials before the regularly constituted
Jewish tribunal, and two trials and a rehearing before the
regularly constituted Roman tribunal. Much has been said
as to the legality of these trials, and much has been said as to
the illegality of them. The following are the principal points
which are asserted as grounds for the onclusion that the
Jewish trial was illegal:
1. The trial was illegal because the arrest was illegal.
The arrest took place at night, which was in violation of the
Hebrew law. It was effected through the agency of a traitor
and an informer, in violation of the Mosaic code.
2. The trial was illegal because Jesus was not permitted
to show whether or not he was, in fact, the Messiah.
3. The trial was illegal because Jesus was found guilty
on his own confession. Caiaphas, you will recall, said: "What
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further need have we of witnesses? Ye have heard the blasphemer."
4. The trial was illegal because the Sanhedrin had previously decided that Jesus must die. This was apparently
done in the preceding February, at a very interesting meeting
when the activities of Jesus were the subject of a hot discussion. At this point it is reported that one of the more levelheaded brethren, by the name of Nicodemus, arose and said:
"Doth our law judge any man before it hear him and know
what he doth?" Apparently the chief priests and the elders
were somewhat confounded by this query.
5. The trial was illegal because the judges were prejudiced.
6. The trial was illegal, because it was conducted at
night.
7. The trial was illegal because it was conducted on the
day before the Sabbath, and on a feast day.
8. The trial was illegal because the actions of the High
Priest were prejudical.
The following are the principal points which are asserted
as the ground for the conclusion that the Roman trial was
illegal:
1. That Jesus had already been acquitted on the charge
on which he was tried.
2. That Pilate was intimidated by the mob.
It has been very easy for men to justify the conclusion
which they desired to reach in this case. They have said that
man was
the trial was illegal because they felt that an innocent
i
executed.
Considered from the standpoint of the Jews, with their
racial and religious background and their feeling of revulsion
against what they regarded as blasphemy, I am of the opinion
that a fair and impartial hearing was not had. As to whether
or not the trial was "legal", namely was in conformity with
the laws and practices of the Jewish Commonwealth, a sound
conclusion cannot be reached by-merely reading the Mishna.
It is first necessary to determine which of the rules prescribed
in the Mishna were in effect in the year 29 A. D. If the rules
that now appear in the Mishna were in effect at that time, I
am satisfied that a legal conviction was an impossibility.

18

DICTA

But the situation is different with Pontius Pilate. He was
a Governor charged with the duty of maintaining order in
his Province. He interrogated and tried the accused. He
found him guiltless and pronounced a judgment of acquittal.
He reiterated this conclusion some three or four times and then
permitted the execution of a prisoner whom he had repeatedly
declared to be innocent. I am convinced in my own mind that
he is responsible for the act which History has condemned.
But analyze the case as we may from a legal s.tandpoint,
I think we will come at last to the conclusion that whatever
crime was committed was a political crime, resulting in a
political trial terminating in an execution inspired by motives
of political expediency. Perhaps the most difficult class of
cases with which the legal profession has to contend. The accusers are inflamed, the seriousness of the crime is magnified
and the Judges, consciously or unconsciously, are biased and
intimidated. Rare indeed is the outcome a satisfactory one.

COLORADO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
(EDfroR's No'.--It is intended in each issue of DICTA to print brief abstracts of
the decisions of the Supreme Court. These abstracts will be printed only after the
time within which a petition for rehearing may be filed has elapsed without such action being taken, or in the event that a petition for rehearing has been filed the abstract
will be printed only after the petition has been disposed of.)

APPEAL AND ERROR-DISTRICT COURT RULES--No. 12,257-

Halter vs. Wade-Decided December 31, 1928.
Facts.-Halter,a debtor under a judgment rendered by
the District Court of the City and County of Denver was, on
December 30, 1927, allowed sixty days for tendering a bill of
exceptions and no extension of time was iven. The bill was
tendered to the trial judge February 1 , 1928, but was not
lodged with the clerk of the Court until March 7, 1928. Notice of this lodging was served on counsel for defendant in
error March 24, 1928. A rule of the Denver District Court
requires that bill shall be lodged with the clerk immediately,
and shall forthwith notify the opposite party, or his attorney.
Wade has moved to strike the bill of exceptions.
Held.-The rule of the District Court has the force and
effect of a statute. It is not in conflict with any other rule or
law and must be observed. Plaintiff in error has not complied; the bill of exceptions must be stricken.
Motion to strike granted.
DIVORCE-ENTRY OF DECREE-STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION-

No. 12,200-Walton vs. Walton-Decided March 4, 1929.
Facts.-Plaintiffbelow, defendant here, filed a complaint
praying for a divorce and charging defendant below with
cruelty and desertion. Defendant filed a cross complaint
charging the plaintiff with cruelty, and seeking a decree of
separate maintenance. Plaintiff withdrew his complaint; defendant amended her cross complaint to pray for an absolute
divorce. The case was heard as a non-contested matter and
an interlocutory decree was entered against the plaintiff in
favor of the defendant. More than six months later the defendant filed a motion to set aside the findings of fact and con-

DICTA

clusions of law, to which the plaintiff answered requesting
that the cause be set down for hearing and trial upon the terms
of alimony, and also praying that a decree of divorce be granted the defendant. The Court modified the property settlement and upon the plaintiff's application, entered a decree of
divorce in favor of the defendant, under Chapter 90 S.L. 1925.
Held.- l-The Court had jurisdiction to modify the
property settlement; 2-the Court erred in entering the decree
at the plaintiff's request and over the defendant's protest because (a) the legislature does not have power to require a
court of equity to grant a decree of divorce upon the application of the guilty party; (b) the act under which the decree
was entered is in violation of Article 3 of the State Constitution, and (c) the act of entering the decree is not merely a
matter of procedure; but even if it were, the legislature has
placed such matters under the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court by vesting it with power to make rules of practice and
procedure, (S.L. 1913, page 447, Chapter 121). Parsons vs.
Parsons, 70 Colorado 154, 198 Pacific is overruled.
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.
12,042 - Nikkel vs.
Lindhorst-DecidedMarch 11, 1929.
Facts.-Nikkel, a lawyer, obtained a loan of $80.00 from
Lindhorst's assignor, and filled in a blank note form so that
it provided for interest at 8% per annum to maturity, and
2% per month thereafter. When the note was not paid Lindhorst brought suit and Nikkel defended on the grounds of
usury under .C.L. 1921, Section 3797.
Held.-The provision for the alleged usurious interest
was inserted in the note by Nikkel fraudulently and without
the lender's knowledge. Nikkel is, therefore, estopped to
maintain his defense.
Judgment affirmed.
USURY-ESTOPPEL OF BORROWER-No.

CREDITOR'S BILL-MARSHALLING ASSETS-ATTORNEY'S FEES

12,017-Legge vs. Peterson-DecidedApril 15, 1929.
Facts.-Thisis an equitable action in the nature of a creditor's bill. Plaintiff below procured judgment against her
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tenant and after execution was returned unsatisfied brought
this action against tenant and bank. Court below marshalled
assets and allowed bank attorney's fees.
Held.- (1) Before the doctrine of marshalling assets will
be applied there must be two funds or properties at the time
the equitable relief is sought belonging to the common debtor
of both creditors on both of which funds one party has a claim
or lien and on one only of which the other party has a claim
or lien.
(2) Attorney's fees cannot be allowed on note in the absence of evidence as to the reasonableness of the fees and absence of evidence that holder of the note had incurred any
liability for or paid any attorney's fees.
(3) Cost of harvesting should have been charged one-half
to lessor and one-half to lessee.
(4) There is no evidence upon which fraud or conspiracy
could be predicated.
Judgment modified and affirmed.
12,113-Wilder
vs. The People-DecidedApril 29, 1929.
Facts.-Defendant below was convicted of violating the
liquor law on three counts, on the charge of possession, operation, and ownership of a still for the manufacture of intoxicating liquor.
Held.-Motion for change of venue properly denied.
Evidence of advice of counsel goes only to the question of intent on the charge of operating a still. The extent to which a
defendant testifying in his own behalf may give to the jury
his life's history, not directly connected with the charge, is
generally discretionary with the trial court. Verdict of the
jury on each count is supported by the evidence.
Judgment affirmed.
CRIMINAL LAW-LIQUOR-EVIDENCE-No.

BILLS AND NOTES-INNOCENT PURCHASER-No.

12,139-

Stewart vs. Public Industrial Bank-Decided April 29,
1929.
Facts.-Public Industrial Bank recovered judgment
against Stewart on a promissory note acquired by the bank
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from the original payee before maturity. Claimed that note
was non-negotiable because it contained a clause authorizing
attorney to confess judgment.
Held.-Evidence sufficient to support finding that the
bank was a bona fide owner of the note, having purchased it
in due course. Inclusion in the note of the clause empowering
attorney to confess judgment did not render the note nonnegotiable.
Judgment affirmed.
BILLS AND

NOTES-FORECLOSURE-DENIAL

OF EXECUTION

COMPARISON OF WRITING--No. 12,109-Wilson vs. Scroggs
-Decided April 29, 1929.
Facts.-This is a foreclosure suit. Defendant filed answer denying execution of note and denying consideration. At
trial plaintiff sought to introduce other notes and deeds of
defendant for comparison of signatures. This evidence was
denied by court below.
Held.-Court should have allowed the introduction of all
evidence which tended to establish the genuineness of the signatures offered as a basis of comparison; should have deter.mined, as a matter of law, whether or not that proof was sufficient to establish the authenticity of the defendant's signature
upon them; and if this was done to his satisfaction, should
have admitted the exhibits as standards of comparison to be
used by the experts as well as the jury.
Reversed and remanded.
PATENT RIGHTS-EQUITY-FORFEITURE-NO. 12,091-The
Operative Service Corporation vs. McIntyre Pump Company-Decided April 29, 1929.
Facts.-McIntyre Pump Company, the owner of certain
patent rights, sold and assigned the patent rights to the defendant below with the exclusive right to manufacture on a
royalty basis. Contract provided for forfeiture in the event
of failure to manufacture and pay royalties. Defendant defaulted.
Held.-Courts of equity have jurisdiction to rescind and
cancel contracts where facts are established which clearly show
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that the injury caused by the breach is irreparable and that
damages are wholly inadequate.
Affirmed.
NON-SUIT-NEGLIGENCE-No. 12,074- Campbell
vs. Stamper Drug Company-Decided April 29, 1929.
Facts.-Lower court directed verdict for the defendant.
Deceased went into drug store and called for quinine. The
clerk gave him strychnine, which caused his death.
Held.-Court below erred in holding that plaintiff and
deceased were guilty of contributory negligence as a matter
of law in failing to determine that the bottle delivered by the
defendant's clerk contained strychnine instead of quinine.
Proof of the violation of the druggist's statute is sufficient to
make out a prima facie case of negligence against the defendant. The question of contributory negligence under the facts
and evidence was for the jury.
Reversed.
ACCIDENT INSURANCE - AGE - WARRANTY - No. 12,284Western Casualty Company vs. Aarons-Decided May 6,
1929.
Facts.-Plaintiffbelow, the assignee of Fannie M. Parker, had judgment against the Insurance Company for $120.00,
being the amount paid to defendant on account of premiums
for twelve years on an accident insurance policy. Parker, in
her application, represented she was fifty-four years old,
when in fact she was over sixty. She continued to pay premiums for twelve years. This suit was brought to recover
the premiums paid on the theory that by this misrepresentation in regard to her age the policy was void and she was
entitled to have the premiums returned.
Held.-The policy was voidable and not void. The company, having accepted the premiums over a period of years,
waived its right to avoid the policy. The insured, having
misrepresented her age but, nevertheless, for a period of
twelve years, having the benefit of the insurance policy, cannot assert that the policy was void and that she is entitled to
the premiums paid thereunder.
Judgment reversed.
DRUGS -
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12,040-In the Matter of
Adjudication of Priorities, etc. vs. The Arkansas Valley
Sugar Beet and Irrigated Land Company, et al-Decided
May 6, 1929.
Facts.-This is a review of a decree of the District Court
of Bent County rendered February 3, 1927, in a statutory proceeding for adjudicating water rights in water district, No.
17, Division No. 2, both for direct irrigation and storage. It
is the same Decree which was considered by this Court in
Holbrook District versus Fort Lyon Company, 84 Colorado
174. The records show that there have been several adjudications in this district. The court below reopened the Water
Right Decree on August 30, 1922, and entered a new decree.
Held.-The lower court had a right to reopen the decree.
Plaintiffs, in the action now under review, themselves had also
asked the trial court to reopen the earlier decree as the Holbrook District did. Therefore, Plaintiffs may not now complain of the very thing which they, themselves, asked to have
done. Priorities, as fixed by the court below, were proper.
Judgment affirmed.
WATER RIGHTS-PRIORITIES--No.

BODY EXECUTION-TIME LIMIT-TIME OF CONFINEMENT-

No. 12,332-Roll vs. Davis-DecidedMay 13, 1929.
Facts.-Roll complains of the ruling of the trial court
denying his motion to quash and recall writ of body execution.
Body execution was issued two and one-half years after judgment, but during all of that time Roll was confined in the
penitentiary under a criminal charge.
Held.-Delay in issuing body execution was excusable
where the judgment debtor was confined in the penitentiary
during the entire period from the entry of the judgment to
the time of issuing execution. Body execution should not be
quashed because of imprisonment for another wrong. Where
the judgment was that Roll should be confined for a period
not to exceed one year, or until the further order of the court,
or until the amount of the judgment has been paid, such judgment is sufficiently definite. The Sheriff of the City and
County of Denver had the authority to take possession of
Roll's body in another county.
Judgment affirmed.
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EQUITY-FORECLOSURE-ACTION AT LAW-No. 12,321-The

Fairview Mining Corporation vs. American Mines &
Smelting Company-Decided May 20, 1929.
Facts.-The grantors of American Mines & Smelting
Company gave to Allen Burris, the grantor of The Fairview
Mining Corporation, a mining lease and option to buy certain
properties. Under this option, various payments were made
and a number of extensions of time for payment were granted.
Aggregate payments of more than $85,000.00 were made.
Plaintiff below brought suit at law to recover possession of
the property.
Held.-The facts pleaded in the answer showed an equitable defense. The grantors in the contract retained title to
the property as security for payment of the agreed purchase
price. The relations between the parties are the same as if
title had passed from the grantor to the grantee, and the latter
had conveyed the title back as security for payment. Plaintiff was wrong in resorting to an action at law for the recovery
of possession. The plaintiff should have employed the equitable remedy of foreclosure and sale.
Judgment reversed and remanded.
FIRE INSURANCE-AUTOMOBILES--APPRAISAL

CLAUSE-No.

12,318-St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company vs.
The Walsenburg Land & Development Company - and
No. 12,319-The Sun Insurance Office vs. Tressler-Decided May 20, 1929.
Facts.-These two cases were consolidated for trial. The
plaintiffs below each were owners of automobiles which were
insured by the defendants below against fire. Both automobiles were wholly destroyed in a fire. Because of failure of
the parties to agree on the damages, appraisers were appointed
under a provision in the policies, to appraise the loss. The
appraisers met and made an award without giving the plaintiffs below an opportunity to present any evidence as to the
value of the cars. Judgment below was for the plaintiffs below.
Held.-The attempted appraisal of the value of the property destroyed was a nullity by reason of the fact that the plain-
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tiffs were given no opportunity to appear before the board of
appraisers at the time the appraisement was made. Every man
has a right to be-heard before judgment. Of course, he may
waive that right, but the appraisal clause in these insurance
policies was not such a waiver of this right. In this case both
cars were totally destroyed; the appraiser had no knowledge
of their -value; and the owners of the cars should have been
given the opportunity of presenting evidence of the value.
Without such opportunity no hearing was had within the
meaning of the law.
Judgment affirmed.
WATER AND WATER RIGHTS-CHANGE OF PARTIES-DELAY-

No. 10,623-The Northern Colorado Irrigation Company
vs. The City and County of Denver DecidedMay 20,1929.
Facts.-This case was docketed in the Supreme Court six
years ago. Through stipulation of the parties for various continuances, but through no fault of the Court, the case was
unnecessarily delayed. In 1924 the plaintiff in error dismissed
the case, and in 1927 other parties moved to reinstate and reopen, which was granted. It appears that in the trial below
all claims presented were not determined.
Held.-That cause should be reversed because the court
below failed to determine all claims presented. The rights
of various water claimants have been seriously inconvenienced
by the long delays which are caused by counsel and not by this
court, and the court will enforce the rule that requests for
delays, even when accompanied by a stipulation, must show
sufficient reasons for extension of time.
Judgment reversed.
LANDS--No. 12,003-Pierce vs.
Marland Oil Company-Decided May 20, 1929.
Facts.-Pierceand McCall, plaintiffs below, brought action against Marland Oil Company of Colorado to recover
damages for alleged breach of contract, to which several defenses were interposed, one of which was that there was no
contract between the parties. The court below held that although extensive negotiations had been carried on, nevertheOIL-CONTRACTS--INDIAN
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less that there was no completed contract, and on this ground
granted a non-suit.
Held.-The evidence plainly shows there was no completed contract between the parties. Among other things, the
vendors were to assign to Marland Oil Company certain leases
they held on Indian Land. The evidence failed to show that
the consent of the Secretary of the Interior to such assignments
which was necessary in order to make a valid assignment had
been obtained. The vendors failed to show that they were in
a position to make the transfer.
Judgment affirmed.
12,306--The South
Denver Bank vs. The Guardian Trust Company-Decided
May 27, 1929.
Facts.-This was an action by The South Denver Bank
to recover from The Guardian Trust Company, as Administrator of the estate of Clarke, the possession of an automobile.
The court below sustained defendant's motion for non-suit.
The automobile was in possession of Clarke at the time of his
death. The defendant trust company qualified as administrator and took possession thereof and was in possession at the
time of the trial. A party by the name of Stanton gave a
chattel mortgage on this same automobile to The South Denver Bank to secure a loan of $1800.00. There was no evidence
to show that Stanton ever had title.
Held.-There was no evidence tending to show either
ownership or right of possession in Stanton or in The South
Denver Bank to this automobile.
Judgment affirmed.
AUTOMOBILES-POSSESSION-TITLE-No.

ASSAULT AND BATTERY-INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE-No.

12,-

148-Osgood vs. The People-DecidedMay 27, 1929.
Held.-Mrs. Osgood was convicted of assault and battery
on an information in two counts, the first of which charged
the defendant and one Phillips with an assault with a deadly
weapon, and the second charging the defendant and Phillips
with assault and battery. Phillips, who was Mrs. Osgood's
chauffeur, engaged in a fist fight with another person in the
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country. Mrs. Osgood, becoming alarmed for her safety,
picked up a revolver that was in the car, got out of the car
and pointed the revolver at a bystander who was not engaged
in the fight. The bystander told her he had nothing to do
with it, whereupon she expressed regret and apologized. She
is not convicted for assault upon the bystander, but for assault
upon the person who was fighting with Phillips.
Held.-There was no evidence justifying such a conviction. The defendant did exactly what any prudent and reasonable person would have done under all the circumstances
of the case, and when she discovered her mistake, she explained her actions and promptly apologized.
Judgment reversed.
CONTRACTS-REAL
CEPTANCE-No.

ESTATE-UNILATERAL

12,142-

CONTRACT -

Ac-

Morath vs. Perkins-Decided

May 27, 1929.
Facts.-Morath,a real estate salesman, sued Perkins and
wife to recover judgment of $38,000.00, as damages for the
failure of defendant to carry out the provisions of an alleged
contract for the sale of defendant's real estate to plaintiff. The
Court below directed a verdict for the defendant on the ground
that the alleged contract in question was an offer to sell and
that it had not been accepted by the plaintiff.
Held.-I. The contract involved was merely an offer to
sell and was unilateral.
2. The evidence was not sufficient to show an acceptance.
Judgment affirmed.
FORECLOSURE-LACHES----No. 12,240-Conrad vs. Scott--De-

cided May 27, 1929.
Facts.-Conradsued Scott to foreclose the lien of a Deed
of Trust dated February 1, 1888, and given to secure the payment of a note of $300.00 of even date, payable in five years.
Among the defenses was that of laches. The court below held
Conrad guilty of laches and dismissed the suit.
Held.-Lapse of time is an important element of laches.
Yet, unless a case falls within the operation of the Statute of
Limitations, there is no such period within which a person
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must assert his claim or be barred by laches. Delay alone is
not laches. Scott purchased the property subject to the Deed
of Trust and had paid no part of the principal or interest of
the note secured thereby. To hold that Conrad cannot be permitted to foreclosure the lien of the Deed of Trust would
operate to cancel a just debt which Scott should pay.
Judgment reversed.
DEEDS-REFORMATION-SUBSEQUENT GRANTEE-No. 12,117
-Waters vs. Massey-HarrisHarvester Company-Decided May 27, 1929.
Facts.-The Harvester Company, a judgment creditor of
Waters, sued Waters and his wife to reform a deed executed
by the latter to her husband so as to include the property intended to be conveyed, instead of that described in the deed.
The erroneous description arose through a mutual mistake of
the parties thereto. A demurrer was overruled and defendant
elected to stand upon the demurrer. The Harvester Company
was not a party to the deed.
Held.-Since the grantee of a grantee in a deed containing a misdescription caused by mutual mistake cannot maintain an action to reform the deed, merely because he is a
grantee neither can a judgment creditor.
Judgment reversed.
WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION-RISKS COVERED BY INSURANCE

POLICY-No. 12,114-Smart, et al, vs. Radetsky-Decided
May 27, 1929.
Facts.-The Industrial Commission awarded compensation to Smart and one other against Radetsky and the insurance
company. It was claimed below that the risk was not covered
by the insurance policy. The insurance policy was issued for
a junk dealer, but provided the general coverage for other
business operations. The employees were injured in dismantling a sugar plant and not upon work carried on by a junk
dealer.
Held.-The insured had been engaged in dismantling
abandoned plants for years to the knowledge of the insurance
company. Dealing in old machinery constitutes second-hand
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machinery business and not junk business, and, therefore, the
clause in the policy under the heading of other business operations would cover this vocation.
Judgment affirmed.
ROADS-PRIVATE WAY-RAILROAD RIGHT-OF-WAY-No. 12,072-The Denver & Salt Lake Railway Company vs. The
Pacific Lumber Company-Decided May 27, 1929.
Facts-This was an action by The Pacific Lumber Company against the railroad company to restrain the defendant
railroad company from interfering with plaintiff's use of a
private crossing over the defendant's railroad track where it
passes across the plaintiff's patented land. The railroad rightof-way was acquired from the United States before any patent
was issued to the plaintiff or his grantors for this land. The
lower court entered an order prohibiting any interference by
the railroad company with the plaintiff's use of the crossing.
Held-The right-of-way granted the railroad company
by Act of Congress was more than a mere easement. It
amounts to a qualified or limited fee, and so long as defendant
railway company maintains its line of road it has the right of
exclusive use and possession of its right-of-way. This not being a public highway crossing, the plaintiff acquired no right
in the private crossing by estoppel.
Judgment reversed.
CRIMINAL LAW-MURDER

-CIRCUMSTANTIAL

EVIDENCE

-

No. 12,327-Ives vs. The People-DecidedJune 3, 1929.
Facts.-Ives was found guilty of murder in the first degree and the jury fixed the penalty of death. Judgment was
pronounced in accordance with the verdict.
Held.-l. The evidence was not circumstantial. Under
our statutes the death penalty could be fixed for the commission of a crime.
2. The evidence was sufficient to support the verdict.
3. The newly discovered evidence was not sufficient to
warrant the granting of a new trial.
Judgment affirmed.
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PROMISSORY NOTE-COGNOVIT-DEFAULT JUDGMENT-No.

12,092-Peterson vs. Vanderlip-DecidedJune 3, 1929.
Facts.-Action was brought to set aside and vacate a former judgment on a cognovit note where there was no service
of summons, and the defendant did not appear at the trial in
person or by an attorney of his own selection, and an attorney,
not the defendant's attorney, appeared and confessed judgment in the principal of the note and interest then due. The
note had already been paid before suit was brought on it.
Held.-The note, having been paid before this action was
instituted, the conduct of the plaintiff in bringing suit upon
the note and obtaining judgment was a fraud upon the court
and its jurisdiction, and a willful abuse of legal process to
accomplish an unworthy and illegal end. The judgment was
unjust and should be vacated and set aside.
Judgment affirmed.
REPLEVIN-BURDEN OF PROOF-No. 12,102-McAlpine vs.

McAlpine-Decided June 3, 1929.
Facts.-McAlpine sued her former daughter-in-law, McAlpine, to recover several articles of jewelry. The case was
tried to the court without a jury. The findings and judgment
were for the defendant.
Held.-I. The evidence was sufficient to support the findings and judgment.
2. The burden of proof was properly placed upon the
plaintiff. Defendant's claim that the jewelry was given by
the plaintiff to her son, and by the son to the defendant as a
wedding present, is not an affirmative defense.
Judgment affirmed.
Loss -INTEREST - No.
12,1S8-LeZotte vs. Bank of Del Norte-Decided June 3,
1929.

BANKS-CERTIFICATE OF DEPOSIT-

Fact.-In 1921 Mrs. Comstock deposited with the Bank

of Del Norte the sum of $3535.00 and received the bank's certificate of deposit therefor, due in ninety days with .interest
at 4% per annum, but no interest was to accrue or to be paid

after maturity. After the maturity of the certificate in 1921,

DICTA

Mrs. Comstock met her death in a sleeping car and her personal effects which she had with her were burned. The certificate of deposit was lost or destroyed.
Held.-The bank is liable for the amount of the certificate of deposit with interest to date of maturity, but is not
liable for interest after maturity. The Statute of Limitations
having run against the certificate, it was not necessary to give
an indemnity bond to the bank.
Judgment affirmed.
RECEIVER - No. 12,090-Stevens vs. Realty
Loan & Finance Company-Decided June 3, 1929.
Facts.-A deed, absolute in form, was given by defendant
below to plaintiff below, to secure the payment of a debt. The
deed was in fact a mortgage. The deed conveyed the property
together with the rents, issues and profits thereof. The property being insufficient in value to discharge the encumbrances
against it and the defendant insolvent, the court below appointed a receiver.
Held.-Evidence sufficient to justify the appointment of
a receiver.
Judgment affirmed.
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